The football industry has grown consistently in the last three decades and now is capable to generate revenues for approximately 18.5 billions euros per year. Despite this growth, football teams failed to translate this opportunity into profits and financial sustainability, thus incurring in substantial losses. For this reason the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) has issued a regulation to induce a change this behavior, reducing debt, decreasing employees costs and reaching the break event point. However, if we use the regulatory compliance management theory to analyse and predict the extent to which sports teams will comply with UEFA's financial regulations, we find that there are several reasons to believe that such compliance will not be achieved. Gathering data from Aida -Bureau van Dijk -we have investigated Italian teams compliance, comparing the economic results achieved before and after the introduction of the Financial Fair Play regulation in a nine-year period of observation. Result show that there are no significant differences in firms' performance, thus our hypothesis has been confirmed. Furthermore, we have investigated if any remarkable change has been produced in terms of competition in the Italian major football league. Consistently with our hypothesis, results confirm that an unwilling process of concentration, in terms of on the field results, is taking place.
profits, the UEFA has introduced the so-called "break-even requirement" (B.E.R). According to this provision, relevant revenues should not be exceeded by relevant costs. Briefly, relevant income and relevant costs are the ones related to the core business of the club, excluding income taxation. However the regulation allows clubs to have an acceptable deviation from the "relevant" zero-profit condition. This acceptable deviation has been defined equal to 5 millions euro for each monitoring period, that consists of three financial reporting years (T; T-1 and T-2). Moreover, this threshold can be branched and raised to 45 millions for the license seasons 2013-14 and 2014-15 and to 30 millions for the license seasons 2015/16, 2016/17 and 2017/18, if this deviations is entirely covered by equity contributions. In terms of debt, the regulation states that the net debt doesn't have to exceed the 100% of total revenues. Finally the regulation is deeply focused on improving investment in infrastructures, including the stadium and the training facilities, whose costs are excluded from the relevant expenses to calculate the B.E.R. in a given monitoring period.
If a club fails to comply with the regulation, the UEFA's Club Financial Control Body will decide the appropriate sanction which can lead, in some cases, to the disqualification from the in progress international competition or from future international competitions.
Given the importance of international competitions, not only in terms of direct revenues, but also in terms of commercial opportunities, in its wider definition, it apparently seems unavoidable the necessity to comply with the described regulation. However, if we deeply analyse the peculiarities of this industry in terms of ownership and control, in terms of objectives, which are not always in line with profit orientation, and in terms of the stakeholders' power, we can recognize that the pressure to comply considerably decreases. Moreover the pressure to comply is directly linked not only to firms' characteristics, but also to the regulations ones and to the way this to elements relate to each other. Therefore we recognize a possible way to deal with the FFPR that is the application of the so-called theory of regulatory compliance management.
As we will theoretically demonstrate in the next section of the paper, there are reasons to believe that compliance to the UEFA regulation will be not achieved. Moreover in the last section of the paper we will investigate the degree of compliance through an empirical analysis conducted on the Italian Serie A.
Besides the introduction, the paper falls in to four sections. In the first section we will focus on the literature review concerning the FFPR and the compliance management theory and we will formulate the hypothesis. The second section will be dedicated to the methodology. In the third section we will display the empirical results of the study. In the last section we will sum up the contribution of the paper, its limitations and suggest further streams of research.
Literature Review and Research Hypotheses
Even if the sport industry, as explained in the previous section, has grown consistently in the last three decades, there is still an important issue to deal with, which is the coexistence of two objectives, namely, the success on the field and the success in the financial statement. But is this really something that we may concern? Is it really an issue? European football clubs, as pointed out, among others, by Dimitropulos (2011) and Ogbonna and Harris (2014) , still have a management culture which consider the emotional logic of winning on the field as a priority compared to the financial and economic result. This is mainly due to the concentration of equity stakes, which leads to the almost absent separation between ownership and control. Even when a professional manager, different from the majority owner, is in charge, the owner has a substantial interference in strategic choices and this implies that the management ends up being in charge on paper only. Owners are often wealthy individuals (Kennedy, 2013) who are interested in sport to fulfil different needs, other than direct profit maximization, such as higher prestige or power. For example, as stated by Iaria (2012) speaking about Silvio Berlusconi, "It's almost impossible to untwine football from his political and business dealings". Moreover, besides non-economic (Maslow, 1954) but still rational objectives, there are furthermore economic motivations that can lead to overinvestment and losses in sport businesses. What we, prima facie, can recognize as benefactors owners or "sugar daddies", besides direct beneficial results in terms of legitimacy or higher public citizenship, in reality, can also have positive results in other business connected to the sport one, in terms, for example, of cost of capital. Moreover, the winning orientation instead of profit orientation can also be explained through the stakeholder theory.
Besides the owner personal orientation there is a substantial contribution to this behavior, which is given by a primary stakeholder as supporters. Supporters, for a sport firm, are something different and definitely more important and pre-eminent in the life of the company than common customers are for a company operating in another industry. When a club obtains poor results on the field, supporters are used to demand for new and costly players and they don't care about the financial sustainability of these transactions (Solberg and Haugen, 2010) .
Someone may say that club can simply ignore this request, but this choice is not so simple, given the negative effect it can have on the stadium attendance, to the revenues from the media, from the merchandizing and so on. In addition, is not even rare that supporters react with animated and violent protests. For these reasons, the owner of a professional football club may neglect the importance of financial sustainability and focus more directly on the on field results (Michie and Oughton, 2005) .
Therefore, a wide body of previous research demonstrate that football clubs behave as win oriented instead as profit oriented (Kesenne, 1996; Vopel, 211; Storm, 2012) and this could be seen even through the methodical overinvestment which has characterized professional clubs in recent years. Clubs are used to obtain poor financial results and to fill this gap through substantial equity contributions. This circumstance has led the previous literature to define the sport industry as a "rat race" or as a "zombie race". As pointed out by Budzinski (2014) , this leads to the methodical market failure (Muller et al., 2012) because, in this industry, firms compete for a fixed and indivisible reward (that is the first place in a competition), since only the winner (the fastest rat)
gets the compensation (the cheese). In other terms, is clear that all competitors are used to increase their equity contribution without increasing their expected output (which is fixed). This will result in a lack of efficiency (Akerlof 1976). The concept of zombie race (Frank, 2014) is even more appropriate for this industry, given that a substantial part of the competing clubs is technically bankrupt, but continue to act like this wasn't their condition.
Given these characteristics of the industry and of its players, we now attempt to join it to the literature in terms of managerial compliance to regulation. This stream of research investigates the problem of ensuring that an enterprise is structured and behave in a way that is recognize to be in accordance to a given regulation and its guidelines.
Regulatory Compliance Management deals with modelling, checking, enforcement and analysis of compliance requirements extracted from regulations of diverse kind such as laws, contract, internal policies, etc (El Kharbili, 2012) . Regulation guidelines, to which firms should comply, specifies the expected behavior and defines tolerated and non-tolerated deviation from the defined archetype and the sanction in which a given subject may incur if not complying. Recent research in the field has stated that when a firm has to comply with a given regulation, one or more department of the firm, such as finance, administrative, information system, etc., may be somehow involved in a change which mostly implies an investment (Perskow, 2003) . Research trends in the field of regulatory compliance mostly focus on different types of domains (healthcare, finance, etc.), types of regulatory compliance (policy, contract or regulations) and solutions, typically detective type or preventive ones. However there are some studies that have addressed the issue of motivation to comply or not to a given regulation. In a study conducted by Amodu (2008) is shown a very clear literature review concerning determinants of compliance and business motivation to comply. In summary, as stated by Kagan (1994) , there are a number of variables influencing the enforcement activity: legal design factors, such as stringency of regulatory mission, legal power and specificity of legal standards and penalties, task environment factors, such as visibility of violations, regulated entities' willingness to comply or seriousness of risks to be prevented, political environment factors, such as strength and aggressiveness of pro-regulation interests or preferences of political authorities (influenced by recent catastrophes, economically urgent projects subject to regulation, etc.) and leadership factors, such as reactive or strong-minded regulatory leaders and degree of staff professionalism. Among other motivation in the decision to comply or not to comply, there are some that are definitely useful to predict the orientation in the field of the sport industry. Kagan and Scholz (1984) state that compliance is more likely when firms are able to pass on the costs of compliance. For example when these costs can be transferred to a third party like costumers. Of course this is not the case of the FFPR, since, contrariwise, compliance will result in firms financial constraint that will imply them to be less likely to hire talented player and thus generate supporters disappointment and reduce their willingness to pay more for tickets and for media subscriptions.
The perceived effect on reputation is another aspect that may influence the decision to comply. According to the previous literature, it can be simplistic to assume that firms make calculation in order to decide whether to comply or not on the basis of their profit maximization. Fisse and Braithwaite (1993) , inquiring this aspect, found that firms are more likely to comply when they think that their reputation will be otherwise affected in a negative way. The same importance given to reputational factors was stated in other works, which highlighted that this concern is even higher in larger firms (Gunningham, 2005) . This condition, as well as the previous, unquestionably cannot be found in professional teams when it comes to comply with the FFPR. First of all because their primary concern, in terms of reputation, is related to the reputation perceived by their supporters and, secondly, because, unless they are disqualified from an international competition, their reputation will not be affected. And we know that the disqualification of a team from the UEFA Champions League or Europe League is definitely a remote event.
Another reason that may influence the decision to comply is closely related to the reputational one and it regards the sanctions or penalty linked to the decision to not comply. Parker (2002) defined the concept of "fear factor" when addressing this issue. The fear to be sanctioned can be a powerful trigger to comply. Is clear that also in this case, teams are not that much motivated to comply since in the last 15 years we have seen only 53 cases of disqualification from the UEFA competitions, which is a relatively small number if we consider that every year about 150 teams take part in the UEFA competitions.
Co-operation and trust are other element to take in account. In this perspective, as stated by Kangan and Scholtz (1984) and by Black (1976) , firms are more likely to comply when they agree with the regulation and when there is proximity ("relational distance") with the regulatory body. Falling this concept in our industry, we can say that is not rare to see teams contesting the UEFA decisions, particularly when it comes to the FFPR. In summer 2017, for example, some teams questioned the capability of Paris Saint Germaine to fulfil the FFPR requirements after hiring Nejmar Jr. from Barcelona for over 200 millions euro. However, at the moment this player is currently taking part to the national and international competitions, without any concomitant verification by the UEFA.
The economic climate may have also an influence on the decision to comply (Atlas, 2007) . In other words, the more economically difficult is the environment, the more permissive will be the reaction to a limited compliance. Also in this case, given the substantial losses experienced by European teams, we will predict a temporary tolerance in terms of sanctions and, therefore, a lower compliance at least in the short term.
Another very important element in the compliance management theory is the convergence of interests between the public and private interest. According to this principle, compliance will be more likely when there is a convergence of interest. In our case we can see a convergence of interest but it seems to be the other way round. In other words, both teams and the UEFA, for different reasons, my probably converge over a lower compliance rather than strict compliance to maximize their utility function in the short term.
Moreover, according to literature, firm size and third party stakeholders are likely to influence the willingness and the capability to comply. Small businesses encounter more difficulties to comply than their larger counterparts. In addition, media, costumers (supporters) and social forces can shape the compliance attitude al well (Hutter and Jones, 2006) . In this industry we are typically dealing with large firms and with high stakeholders pressure to not comply.
According to Genn (1993) other factors, which encourage compliance, are the ownership dispersion and the workforce resistance or pressure. In our case, ownership and workforce orientation are both resistant to compliance. The way in which ownership are motivated to compliance have been previously discussed and, of course, motivations affecting the workforce are evident, since the first provision of the FFPR requires a reducing their salaries.
Therefore, all these reasons concerning the regulatory compliance management lead us to formulate our hypothesis in the following way: "Professional football teams are not complying with the main regulatory requirements contained in the UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulation".
Materials and Method
In order to determine the sample on which focus our analyses, we first proceeded to analyse the ranking of the Italian Serie A in the last 10 years. The Serie A championship is composed of 20 teams each year, but clearly, over the last 10 years, more than 20 teams have taken part to this competition. In particular, the teams that have competed in the Italian Series A, in the last ten years, were 33. In order to assess the greater or lesser compliance with the FFPR, it was decided to limit the analysis to those teams that have played most of the times in the major Italian competition and who have achieved the best results on the field. For this reason, to each team and in each season was given a score ranging from 1 to 20, depending on the position achieved in each season. In other words, a score of 20 points has been given to the team that won the championship and only one point has been given to the one that arrived last. The result of this allocation made it possible to order the teams according to the results achieved in ten years of competition. Subsequently, all the teams that no longer compete in Serie A, or who have not achieved significant sporting results in the last 10 years, have been removed from the sample. The sample was therefore limited to the 15 teams of major importance, as shown in the following table (Table 1) . 
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